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1 Introduction
In the economic literature (see e.g. Lazear & Rosen (1981), Green & Stokey
(1983), Kräkel (2002), (2003), Chen (2003), or Dubey & Haimanko (2003)),
promotion tournaments are usually modeled in the following way: There are
several employees (he) who compete for a promotion and thus exert e¤ort.
E¤ort in combination with some random components results in individual
output. Then, the employee attaining highest individual output is promoted
to a vacant workplace at a higher layer in the hierarchy.
In my view, there are two main reasons, why this approach is inappropri-
ate or at least insu¢ cient to model promotion decisions. First, in contrast
to other incentive devices such as e.g. piece-rates or bonus payments, it is ex
ante oftentimes unclear, when the promotion takes place and, accordingly,
when the wage increase connected with the promotion is realized, i.e. when
the winning employee is rewarded for outperforming the other employees.
Only rarely do the parties know for sure that a workplace becomes vacant
at a certain point in time and so when a promotion actually takes place.
More frequently, a workplace should become vacant, if, unexpectedly, an em-
ployee leaves the rm. Hence, instead of being sure that a promotion takes
place after e¤orts have been chosen, employees should assign probabilities
to workplaces becoming vacant at certain points in time. Second, promo-
tions are rarely linked to veriable measures such as e.g. individual output.
On the contrary, there are usually supervisors (she) deciding about whom
to promote. That is, promotion decisions are mainly based on subjective
assessments of employeesqualities. In this context, it is probably the case
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that supervisors have imperfect recall, i.e. when deciding about which em-
ployee to promote, they do not recall all their previous impressions of the
employees.
I set up a model, where the two points of criticism are taken into account.
A multi-period setting is considered, where, at some point in time, a vacancy
on a higher layer in the hierarchy may arise. In this case, a supervisor
decides about which employee to promote to this vacancy. Thereby, she
takes into account impressions of the employees she has obtained in previous
periods. Incorporating di¤erent ideas from psychology, a case distinction is
introduced, when modeling, how the supervisor aggregates the impressions
to a single evaluation. First, recent impressions are given higher weights in
order to account for the fact that recent impressions are more likely to be
recalled. Second, I attach lower weights to recent impressions. This implies
that early impressions are most important for the evaluation process. The
supervisor might form a view on the employees in early periods and rethink
this view, only if she obtains impressions that extremely contradict her view.
In this setting, the determinants of employeese¤orts are analyzed. As-
suming that the occurrence probability of the vacancy is constant over time,
it is focused on how e¤orts depend on this probability. If the probability
changes, promotions after some periods become less likely, while they may
become more likely after other periods. Thus, when deciding about their
e¤orts, employees switch attention from the former periods to the latter
ones. Then, four e¤ects can be eliminated determining whether or not ef-
forts increase. Interestingly, the sign of these e¤ects oftentimes depends on
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our assumptions about the supervisor, i.e. on whether or not the supervisor
values recent impressions more strongly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section gives
some arguments for the behavioral assumptions concerning the supervisor.
In Section 3, the basic model is presented. Section 4 contains several model
extensions and Section 5 concludes.
2 Information processing in the human brain
In contrast to computers the human brain does not store all the informa-
tion it receives. Forgetting is a natural task of the brain so that a persons
recall is always imperfect. Despite the clearness of this nding, economic
models usually consider totally rational decision makers being aware of the
complete history of the model, i.e. having perfect recall.1 I deviate from
this assumption and consider a supervisor promoting one of two subordi-
nates on the basis of several impressions received in di¤erent periods. While
a rational supervisor with perfect recall would make his decision based on
the sum of all single impressions, a supervisor with imperfect recall might
decide di¤erently. In order to make a more founded prediction of how imper-
fect recall a¤ects the promotion decision, let us take a look at psychological
work dealing with storage of information in the human brain and subjective
1There exist a few papers considering the di¢ culties in transferring results from models
with perfect recall to models with imperfect recall. See e.g. Kuhn (1953), Piccione &
Rubinstein (1997), or for a textbook treatment of imperfect recall the fourth chapter in
Rubinstein (1998).
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evaluations of people.
It is clear that, due to the complexity of the topic, only an incomplete
overview can be given. I thus restrict attention to two opposing e¤ects that
seem to be of particular importance. First, psychologists argue that people
are more likely to retrieve recently and frequently used concepts than con-
cepts not recently or frequently activated.2 Events that occurred a short time
ago are often remembered, while earlier events are harder to recall. Applied
to our problem, this means that supervisors should be most likely to recall
impressions that have been formed not so long ago.3
Although this argumentation is quite intuitive, things may work the other
way round. In the context of information processing in the human brain,
psychologists emphasize the important role of priming.4 Loosely speaking,
priming means that information which is conicting with or unrelated to
previous impressions is less easily stored than information that is in line with
previous impressions. A simple example may underline this e¤ect. Consider a
woman who is going to meet a man for the rst time and is told that the man
has a particular habit. During the meeting, the woman stores information
tting in her picture of the man, i.e. being connected with the mans habit,
more easily than other information. For our model, this implies that early
impressions are of higher importance than later ones, for the supervisor is
2See e.g. the textbook by Fiske & Taylor (1984), p. 244.
3Note that this e¤ect might be further enforced, if a persons characteristics change
over time. In this case, it is very natural to attach a higher weight to recent impressions.
4See for experiments highlighting the role of priming e.g. Higgins et al. (1977) or Srull
& Wyer (1979).
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little likely to reassess her view on the employees. Note that this is very
similar to the conservatism e¤ect that has been introduced by Edwards (1968)
into the economic literature.
In order to give consideration to both approaches, a supervisor is con-
sidered who evaluates the employees according to a weighted sum of the
single impressions she receives. Depending on monotonicity properties of the
weights, both described ideas can be captured. If the impressionsweights
are monotonically decreasing in the temporal distance from the time of eval-
uation, that is, if impressions from the past are less inuential than present
impressions, we are in the rst case, where supervisors are likely to forget
information that was obtained long ago. If, on the other hand, the weights
are increasing in the temporal distance from the time of evaluation, the rst
impression is the most important one and we describe the second scenario.
Finally, if the weights are constant, the supervisor is totally rational and
takes all relevant information equally into account.
3 The basic model
Consider two risk-neutral employees who, at the same time t = 1, begin to
work in a department of a rm, which is managed by a risk-neutral supervisor.
Overall, each employee works T > 1 periods in the rm and discounts future
utility at a common factor  < 1. In an arbitrary period t, employee i,
i = 1; 2, exerts unobservable e¤ort eit in order to produce output yit =
f(eit), where f , unless stated otherwise, is an increasing concave function.
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E¤ort entails costs for the employee, which are given by the increasing and
convex function C (eit). This cost function satises C (0) = 0,
@C(0)
@eit
= 0,
and @C(eit)
@eit
= 1, for eit ! 1, where the last two conditions ensure that, as
long as monetary incentives are present, the employeesequilibrium e¤orts
are always strictly positive, but nite.5 A natural interpretation for this cost
function is that an employee voluntarily exerts a certain e¤ort, which is here
normalized to zero. Any e¤ort exceeding this voluntary level is costly to
the employee. Output is supposed to be unobservable by all parties and so
cannot be used to incentivize the employees. Instead, assume that the rm
uses promotions as incentive device.6 That is, the two employees know that,
at some point in time, there may arise a vacancy on a higher layer in the
hierarchy, which will be lled by one of them. On the higher layer, a wage of
w > 0 is paid in every period, while the current wage is normalized to zero.7
Furthermore, suppose that it is important for the rm to ll the vacancy.
That is, an unlled vacancy leads to highly negative prot. Therefore, the
rm is always interested in lling the vacancy so that promotions are indeed
a credible incentive device. In case the workplace on the higher layer is
lled, let the output from this workplace be given by a constant y. This
5In the model, it may sometimes be that monetary incentives vanish. In this case, the
employees are indi¤erent between choosing zero e¤ort and e¤ort slightly above zero. It is
then assumed that they decide for the former and choose zero e¤ort.
6The optimality of promotions as incentive device is discussed in Section 4.3.
7In this section, we assume the wage structure to be exogenously given. This could
e.g. be the case, if minimum wages are set by unions and the rm nds it unprotable
to raise wages above their minimum level. Section 4.1 extends the model to encompass
endogenous wages.
7
simply means that this output depends on factors, which are beyond the
scope of the model. The emergence of a vacancy on the higher layer follows
a simple Markov process. In particular, the probability that, in any period,
the vacancy arises and one of the employees is promoted equals  and does
not change from time to time.8 Further, once the vacancy has been lled,
there will never arise a second one.
If a vacancy arises, the supervisor will have to decide, which employee
to promote. Her decision is based on her impression of the employeesper-
formances that she has formed in earlier periods. As indicated before, we
assume that the supervisor bases her decision on a weighted sum of her ob-
tained impressions. Let the impression the supervisor forms of employee i in
period t be given by9
sit = eit + "it (1)
"it denotes an error term, which is independently10 drawn from a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance 2. It accounts for the fact that
the supervisor cannot perfectly monitor each employee and, thus, does only
get an imprecise impression of each employees performance. Further, we
make the assumption that the employees know the realizations of the sits.
8Section 4.2 deals with varying occurrence probabilities.
9In this model, inuence activities are neglected. Although subjective evaluation
schemes generally su¤er from inuence activities, they seem to be less important for pro-
motion decisions, as these are usually done more carefully. See, for an argumentation
along these lines, e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) p. 407.
10The independence assumption a¤ects both, i and t. This means that the realization of
the error term is independent of the opponents error term realization and of realizations
of the error terms from prior periods.
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They could e.g. monitor each other and get similar impressions or deduce
the supervisors impressions from discussions with her. If the workplace
becomes vacant directly after period t, the supervisor will promote the rst
employee, only if
Pt
j=1 t j (e1j + "1j   e2j   "2j) > 0.11 0 is the weight for
the most recent impressions, 1 for the impressions that have been obtained
one period earlier and so on. Hence, in the model, where recent impressions
play the most important role, we have 0  1  :::  T  0, with at
least one inequality being strict. If the inequalities are reversed so that
0  0  1  :::  T , we are in the model, where early impressions are
most important. Finally, the perfectly rational decision maker is a special
case of this model, requiring 0 = ::: = T > 0.
Before turning to the model solution, it is convenient to dene the dis-
tribution function of a normally distributed random variable with zero mean
and variance 22
Pm 1
j=0 
2
j by Fm () and the corresponding density function
by fm (). Further, let s1t   s2t, for t  1, be given by st and "1t   "2t by
"t.
The model is solved by backward induction. In period T , the employees
have no incentive to choose higher e¤ort than their voluntary e¤ort, hence
e1T = e2T = 0.12 This is also true in each period after the promotion tour-
11I implicitly assume that the supervisor always proposes the employee for promotion
that she assesses as the better one. This assumption is relatively innocuous. If the decision
rule was changed, e¤ort incentives would break down and performance in the supervisors
department would decline. This would clearly be problematic for the supervisor.
12One might wonder, why the employees are not red in the nal period of their career.
A possible reason is closely related to our assumption that employees voluntarily choose a
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nament. That is, if a vacancy has arisen and one of the employees has been
promoted, e¤ort incentives disappear and optimal e¤orts are zero. Turn
now to period T   1 and suppose that both employees are still on the lower
layer of the hierarchy. The two employeesmaximization problems are then,
respectively, given by
Max
e1T 1
F1(0 (e1T 1   e2T 1) +
T 2X
t=1
T 1 tst)w   C(e1T 1) (2)
Max
e2T 1
 
1  F1(0 (e1T 1   e2T 1) +
T 2X
t=1
T 1 tst)
!
w (3)
 C(e2T 1)
Each employee maximizes the discounted payment in case of being pro-
moted times the probability of being promoted minus costs entailed by e¤ort.
The rst-order conditions to the two maximization problems are13
f1(0 (e1T 1   e2T 1) +
T 2X
t=1
T 1 tst)w0   @C(e1T 1)
@e1T 1
= 0 (4)
f1(0 (e1T 1   e2T 1) +
T 2X
t=1
T 1 tst)w0   @C(e2T 1)
@e2T 1
= 0 (5)
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. both
certain e¤ort level. This e¤ort may be high enough to justify an employment in the nal
period. Formally, if we assume f(0)  0, there is no need to re the employees, if they
choose zero e¤ort. Note, however, that, normalizing the employeesreservation utilities to
zero, the results remain unchanged, even if the employees are red in the nal period of
their career.
13As shown by e.g. Lazear & Rosen (1981), the second-order conditions will only hold,
if the density function f1() is su¢ ciently at or the e¤ort cost function su¢ ciently steep.
In what follows, it is assumed that this is the case so that the rst-order conditions indeed
characterize a maximum.
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employees choose same e¤ort e1T 1 = e2T 1 =: eT 1. This e¤ort is implic-
itly given by @C(eT 1)
@eT 1
= f1(
PT 2
t=1 T 1 tst)w0 =: Y . As the e¤ort cost
function is convex, e¤ort increases in the right-hand-side of the equality. For
instance, f1(
PT 2
t=1 T 1 tst) gets lower the more
PT 2
t=1 T 1 tst deviates
from zero. The absolute value of this sum measures the head start of the
currently leading employee before period T   1. Hence, if it increases, com-
petition in period T   1 will become less intense and e¤ort will decline. The
following proposition states a corresponding result on the relation between
eT 1 and .
Proposition 1 If, in period T 1, both employees are still on the lower layer
of the hierarchy, this period e¤ort is strictly increasing in .
Proof. As C (et) is convex,
@eT 1
@
> 0, @Y
@
> 0. This condition is equivalent
to f1(
PT 2
t=1 T 1 tst)w0 > 0, which is clearly satised.
Proposition 1 is very intuitive. It says that the more likely it is that
a promotion takes place, the higher is the e¤ort chosen by the employees.
This is not very surprising, as, in period T   1, e¤orts will be worthless, if
no vacancy arises. In other words, in period T   1, e¤orts depend on the
expected tournament prize w so that higher  makes it more worthwhile to
exert e¤ort.
Consider now period T 2 in order to see, whether or not the results from
Proposition 1 will continue to hold, if we allow e¤orts to a¤ect the promotion
probabilities in di¤erent periods. The two employeesmaximization problems
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are, in this case, given by (6) and (7), respectively.
Max
e1T 2
F1(0 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst)w
 
 + 2

(6)
+F2
 
1 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
!
(1  )w2   C(e1T 2)
Max
e2T 2
 
1  F1(0 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst)
!
w
 
 + 2

(7)
+
 
1  F2
 
1 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
!!
(1  )w2   C(e2T 2)
E¤ort here a¤ects two probabilities. It a¤ects the promotion probability in
the current period (F1(0 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)) and in the
following period (F2

1 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst

 (1  )). Dif-
ferentiating with respect to e¤ort, yields the following rst-order conditions:
0 = f1(0 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst)w
 
 + 2

0 (8)
+f2
 
1 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
!
(1  )w21   @C(e1T 2)
@e1T 2
0 = f1(0 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst)w
 
 + 2

0 (9)
+f2
 
1 (e1T 2   e2T 2) +
T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
!
(1  )w21   @C(e2T 2)
@e2T 2
Again, the equilibrium is symmetric, hence e1T 2 = e2T 2 =: eT 2. The
rst-order conditions thus simplify to @C(eT 2)
@eT 2
= f1(
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)w
 
 + 2

0+
f2
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst

(1  )w21 =: Z. From the last condition, it is
easy to derive the next proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that, in period T  2, both employees are still on the
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lower layer of the hierarchy. Then, @eT 2
@
> 0, if and only if f1(
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)
 
 + 2

0 >
(2  1) f2
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst

21.
Proof. As C (et) is convex,
@eT 2
@
> 0 , @Z
@
> 0. The latter condition is
given by f1(
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)w
 
 + 2

0 (2  1) f2
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst

w21 >
0 , f1(
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)
 
 + 2

0 > (2  1) f2
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst

21:
Proposition 2 o¤ers the rather surprising result that e¤ort may be de-
creasing in . To explain this, recall that, in period T   2, e¤ort a¤ects the
promotion probability after two periods, period T  2 and period T  1. The
two events, promotion after period T   2 or after period T   1, are attached
weights according to their probabilities of occurrence. If  decreases, the
rst event becomes less likely, whereas the second event becomes more likely,
i¤  > 0:5. If a decrease in  makes no event more likely, i.e. if   0:5,
e¤ort will certainly decrease. This is similar to the e¤ect in Proposition 1.
If   0:5, it becomes more likely that no promotion takes place at all and
e¤ort is completely worthless. Hence, the expected reward for performing
best decreases and so do optimal e¤orts. Things become more complicated
in case  > 0:5. Then, the employees switch their attention, while deciding
about how much e¤ort to provide, from period T   2 to period T   1. Four
e¤ects inuencing the provision of e¤ort must, in this case, be distinguished:
First, there is a simple time e¤ect. The later an employee is promoted, the
less periods remain, where the employee receives the higher wage. Therefore,
a promotion after period T   2 is assigned a weight  + 2, whereas the
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corresponding weight for a promotion after period T   1 is 2. Hence, this
e¤ect entails a decrease in e¤ort, when attention is switched from period
T   2 to period T   1.
Second, there is a variance e¤ect. An evaluation after period T   2 is
connected with less exogenous noise than an evaluation after period T   1.
This may either enhance or decrease e¤ort. The rst case arises, if, at the
beginning of period T   2, one employee has a high head start. In this
case, competition is very low and will be intensied, if the impact of random
components on the promotion decision gets higher. With more noise, the
initial head start is less decisive for the promotion decision and it is more
worthwhile to exert e¤ort. If, on the other hand, no employee has a very high
head start at the beginning of period T   2, more noise will decrease e¤orts,
as, in this case, more noise reduces the e¤ect of e¤ort on the promotion
decision. Graphically, this e¤ect can be nicely demonstrated by plotting the
density functions of two normal distributions with zero mean and variances
21 = 2
220, 
2
2 = 2
2(20 + 
2
1) into one diagram. One can then see that,
for values close to zero, the density function of the rst distribution (the
distribution with the lower variance) lies above the other density function,
while, for values far from zero, the relationship is the other way round.
Third, there is a judgment e¤ect. E¤ort exerted in period T   2 may
a¤ect the supervisors judgment after periods T   2 and T   1 di¤erently.
If a promotion takes place after period T   2, the productivity of eT 2 in
inuencing the supervisor is given by 0. In contrast, the respective pro-
ductivity in case a promotion takes place after period T   1 is 1. Hence,
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the change in e¤ort due to the judgment e¤ect is positive (negative, zero),
if 1 > (<;=)0. In words, if the supervisor values past impressions more
(less, equally) strongly than present ones, a switch in attention from period
T   2 to T   1 has a positive (negative, neutral) e¤ect on eT 2, as eT 2 is
more (less, equally) productive in inuencing the supervisors judgment after
period T   1 than after period T   2.
Finally, there is a weight e¤ect. If a period passes, the weights the super-
visor attaches to di¤erent impressions may change. This implies that unequal
starting positions in period T 2 might be transformed into less or even more
unequal starting positions in period T   1. To assess this e¤ect on a more
formal level compare the two sums in Proposition 2 and assume without loss
of generality that
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst > 0. We want to determine, when the
rst sum exceeds the absolute value of the second sum. Suppose, for the
moment, that the single weights are interconnected in that t = kt 1, for
t = 1; :::; T , with k > 0. Then, we get the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Let t = kt 1, for t = 1; :::; T , and
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst > 0. Then,
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst
8>>>><>>>>:
>
=
<
9>>>>=>>>>;

T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
() k
8>>>><>>>>:
<
=
>
9>>>>=>>>>; 1 (10)
Proof. We rst show that
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst > 0 together with t = kt 1
implies that
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst > 0. From t = kt 1, it follows that t = k
t0.
Then,
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst can be rewritten as
PT 3
t=1 k
T 2 t0st = 1k
PT 3
t=1 k
T 1 t0st =
1
k
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst. It directly follows that
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst is positive. To
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prove Lemma 3, it remains to be shown when
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst >
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst.
Using
PT 3
t=1 k
T 2 t0st = 1k
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst, this condition simplies to
k < 1. Similarly,
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst < (=)
PT 3
t=1 T 1 tst , k > (=)1.
Again, there is a simple intuition behind this Lemma. Employee 1, i.e. the
initially leading employee (recall the assumption
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst > 0), must
have reached a better impression than employee 2 in at least one period. On
the other hand, employee 2 may or may not have reached better impressions
than employee 1 in some periods. If the supervisor attaches a higher weight
to recent (early) impressions, these better impressions in previous periods
are given higher (lower) weight in period T   2 than in period T   1. Hence,
with t = kt 1, the head start of the initially leading employee is more (less)
likely to be outweighed in period T   1 than in period T   2. A switch in
attention from period T   2 to period T   1 then yields more (less) intense
competition and thus higher (lower) e¤orts.
Note that this argumentation does not hold for arbitrary weight sequences
(t). For example, under an arbitrary sequence, the weights of the currently
losing employees better impressions might decrease stronger than the other
weights and this may entail lower competition. To demonstrate this, suppose
that we consider the fourth period14 and that s1 = 0, s2 =  1, s3 = 1,
0 = 1 = 1, 2 = 0:9, 3 = 4 = ::: = 0. In this case,
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst =
0:1 > 0 and
PT 3
t=1 (T 2 t   T 1 t)st =  0:8 < 0. Hence, although recent
impressions are attached highest weights, the starting positions become more
uneven, as time passes.
14Note that this implies that T = 6.
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Despite this counter example, it is oftentimes the case that, even for ar-
bitrary weight sequences, the results from Lemma 3 remain valid. If time
passes and the supervisor attaches highest value to recent impressions, un-
equal starting positions tend to become more even. Further, notice that,
when all st have same sign, the results from Lemma 1 denitely hold, even
for arbitrary weight sequences.
Summarizing, we have seen that the signs of the third and the fourth e¤ect
depend on how the supervisor processes information. If early impressions are
of particular relevance, the third e¤ect is positive and the fourth e¤ect likely
to be negative. Similarly, if the supervisor attaches a higher weight to recent
impressions (acts as a totally rational decision maker), the third e¤ect is
negative (neutral) and the fourth e¤ect probably positive (neutral).
Continuing backward induction, one can see that the results derived in
Proposition 2 combined with the given intuition are quite robust. In a given
period, a change in  alters the occurrence probabilities of the events "pro-
motion after the current period", "promotion after the next period" and so
on. E¤ort is chosen such that the new occurrence probabilities are prop-
erly taken into account. Some events become more likely and are attached
a higher weight, while others become less likely and are attached a lower
weight. To decide, whether or not e¤ort increases, one has to trade-o¤ ef-
fort incentives concentrating on the events that become more likely with
incentives concentrating on the events that become less likely. The e¤ects
determining this trade-o¤ are the same e¤ects as described above. That is,
determining the sign of @et
@
, for t = 1; :::; T   3 may become more di¢ cult,
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but the e¤ects a¤ecting the sign do not change.
Consider some arbitrary period t. With a similar reasoning as before, one
can show that optimal e¤orts are again symmetric and given by
@C(et)
@et
=
w
1  
T tX
k=1
fk
 
t 1X
j=1
t j+k 1sj
!
(1  )k 1 k 1(k T t+1) (11)
It is then very easy to show that @et
@
> 0 is equivalent to
T tX
k=1
fk
 
t 1X
j=1
t j+k 1sj
!
(1  )k 1 k 1(k   T t+1) (12)
> 
T tX
k=1
fk
 
t 1X
j=1
t j+k 1sj
!
(k   1) (1  )k 2 k 1(k   T t+1)
, which can be interpreted as explained before.
4 Extensions
In this section, the model assumptions are relaxed in several ways. First
(in Section 4.1), I discuss, whether or not the model results will change, if
we endogenize the wages. Thereafter (in Section 4.2), I let the probability
that a vacancy arises di¤er from period to period. Finally, in Section 4.3, I
discuss the optimality of the used incentive scheme under the current model
assumptions.
4.1 Endogenous Wages
In this section, the supervisor endogenously determines the two employees
wages on the two layers of the hierarchy. In this context, assume that the su-
pervisor wishes to maximize the present value of rm prots. Alternatively,
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one could introduce a rm manager into the model determining the employ-
eeswages and suppose that the supervisors only task is to monitor the
employees. Two assumptions are made facilitating the analysis. First, rene-
gotiation of the original contract is supposed to be prohibitively costly, hence
the parties do never change the initial contract terms. Renegotiation may,
for example, prevent the employees from working on their tasks so that the
gains from renegotiation are outweighed by the loss in production. Second,
the employees are assumed to be limitedly liable implying that the wages on
both layers have to be non-negative. This allows us to neglect participation
constraints. Under limited liability, the employees always achieve a strictly
positive payo¤. This is easily demonstrated. By choosing zero e¤ort, an em-
ployee occurs no e¤ort costs and nevertheless may win the tournament and
become promoted. With non-negative prizes and at least one strictly positive
prize, the employee can ensure a positive expected payo¤ by choosing zero
e¤ort. Hence, if deviating and choosing strictly positive e¤ort, the employee
must do better so that expected payo¤s are strictly positive. Normalizing
the reservation utilities to zero (as I do in this paper), participation of the
employees is always guaranteed.15
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the supervisor sets the
15Note that the cancellation of either assumption would make the model intractable. If
renegotiation were possible, the supervisor would adjust the wage structure to the actual
standing in the promotion tournament. Then, by choosing e¤ort the employees could not
only a¤ect their promotion probability, but also the wage structure. This would extremely
complicate the analysis. Similarly, unlimited liability would make the model intractable,
as participation not only in the rst tournament, but in all rounds needed to be ensured.
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wage on the lower layer of the hierarchy equal to zero. A higher wage would
entail higher monetary costs and decrease incentives for the employees and
so cannot be optimal. In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible,
consider the case T = 4 and assume that the supervisor discounts future
prots at the same factor  as the employees. The supervisors optimization
problem is then given by
Max
w
2f (e1) +  [(1  ) 2E [f (e2)]  w] (13)
+2

(1  )2 2E [f (e3)]   (2  )w
  3  3  3+ 2w
s:t:
@C(e3)
@e3
= f1(1s2 + 2s1)w0;
@C(e2)
@e2
= f1(1s1)w
 
 + 2

0 + f2 (2s1) (1  )w21;
@C(e1)
@e1
= f1(0)w
 
 + 2 + 3

0 + f2 (0) (1  )w
 
2 + 3

1
+f3 (0) (1  )2 w32
, with E [] denoting the expectations operator. It is implicitly assumed
that the wage contracts to be derived only hold for the two competing em-
ployees. Wages of employees who are already on the higher layer of the
hierarchy are una¤ected. Further, in maximization problem (13), the out-
put to be realized from a lled workplace on the higher layer is neglected.
As this output is constant, this negligence is unproblematic. The following
proposition contains the solution to problem (13):
Proposition 4 In case T = 4, the optimal wage w on the higher layer of
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the hierarchy is implicitly given by
0 = 2
@f(X(t))
@X
@X (t)
@t
t
w
+ 
24(1  ) 2 +1Z
 1
@f(X(u))
@X
@X (u)
@u
u
w
g("1)d"1   
35
+2
24(1  )2 2 +1Z
 1
+1Z
 1
@f(X(z))
@X
@X (z)
@z
z
w
g("1)g ("2) d"1d"2    (2  )
35
 3  3  3+ 2
, withX =

@C(e)
@e
 1
, t = f1(0)w
 
 + 2 + 3

0+f2 (0) (1  )w
 
2 + 3

1+
f3 (0) (1  )2 w32, u = f1(1"1)w
 
 + 2

0+f2 (2"1) (1  )w21
, z = f1(1"2 + 2"1)w0 and g() denoting the density function of a
normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance 22.
Proof. Dening X :=

@C(e)
@e
 1
, it follows that
E [f (e2)] =
+1Z
 1
f
 
X
 
f1(1"1)w
 
 + 2

0 + f2 (2"1) (1  )w21

g("1)d"1;
E [f (e3)] =
+1Z
 1
+1Z
 1
f (X (f1(1"2 + 2"1)w0)) g("1)g ("2) d"1d"2;
e1 = X(f1(0)w
 
 + 2 + 3

0 + f2 (0) (1  )w
 
2 + 3

1
+f3 (0) (1  )2 w32)
The condition in Proposition 4 is then obtained by inserting these values into
the prot formula and calculating the rst-order condition.
When determining the wage on the higher layer of the hierarchy, the su-
pervisor trades-o¤ the gains from increasing w with the corresponding costs.
Increasing w leads to higher e¤ort (or, alternatively, to higher expected ef-
fort), and consequently, to higher output, but also to higher costs in terms of
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wage payments. These gains and costs are weighted according to their tem-
poral occurrence and their respective occurrence probabilities. For instance,
a wage payment in period 4 is attached a weight 3
 
3  3+ 2, as it is
discounted by the factor 3 and occurs with probability 
 
3  3+ 2 =
+ (1  )+ (1  )2 .
In order to assess, whether or not the results from Section 3 continue to
hold, it is convenient to simplify the model by assuming specic forms for
f(e) and C(e). Let, in this context,
f(e) =
8><>: ln e, for e  10, for 0  e < 1 (14)
and
C(e) = 0:5ce2; c > 0 (15)
Further, assume that c is so small that, in equilibrium, e > 1 always holds.
The condition in Proposition 4 then simplies to
w = 2
1 +  (1  ) + 2 (1  )2
+ 2 (2  ) + 3  3  3+ 2 (16)
It is easy to see that @w

@
< 0. A higher  makes a payment of w in
all periods more likely. So, the expected wage costs increase, leading to a
decrease in w. A change in  has thus a further e¤ect on e¤ort. To recognize
this, consider the total derivative det
d
. This derivative can be split up into
det(;w)
d
= @et(;w)
@
+ @et(;w)
@w
@w
@
. The second summand is strictly negative.
Hence, with endogenous wages, the result that e¤ort may be decreasing in
, is not o¤set, but even enforced. Besides the e¤ects on e¤ort illustrated
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in Section 3, an increase in  yields a decrease in w which induces e¤ort to
decline.
4.2 Consideration of varying occurrence probabilities
Let us return to the case of exogenous wages. Up to this point, the occurrence
probability of a vacancy was assumed to remain constant over time. In this
section, we depart from that assumption and assume that, in period h, a
vacancy arises with the following probability:
Prob fvac in hg =
8><>: Min

qh 1; 1
	
; if no vacancy has arisen in t = 1; :::; h  1
0; otherwise
(17)
Assume that q > 0. Further, let q either exceed 1 or be smaller than 1.
In the former case, qh is monotonically increasing in h, in the latter case,
it is monotonically decreasing.16 For q > 1, it becomes more likely that a
promotion actually takes place, as time passes, while, for q < 1, the reverse
is true.
Again, the main results can already be obtained by considering e¤ort
choices in periods T   1 and T   2. In period T   1, e¤ort is implicitly given
by @C(eT 1)
@eT 1
= f1(
PT 2
t=1 T 1 tst)q
T 2w0. It is thus still increasing in .
This is a simple extension of Proposition 1. In period T   1, the employees
base their e¤ort decisions on the expected winner-prize, hence e¤orts increase
in .
16Notice that, in the former case, the model parameters are assumed to be such that
qh  1 always holds on the equilibrium path.
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In period T   2, one can show that optimal e¤orts are implicitly given by
@C(eT 2)
@eT 2
= f1(
T 3X
t=1
T 2 tst)qT 3w
 
 + 2

0 (18)
+f2
 
T 3X
t=1
T 1 tst
! 
1  qT 3 qT 2w21
The condition in Proposition 2 guaranteeing that eT 2 increases in  is then
replaced by f1(
PT 3
t=1 T 2 tst)
 
 + 2

0 >
 
2qT 2  q f2 PT 3t=1 T 1 tst 21.
Its interpretation is qualitatively the same as in Section 3. The only di¤er-
ence is an additional e¤ect due to the varying occurrence probabilities. This
e¤ect alters the rst factor on the right-hand side of the inequality from
(2  1) to  2qT 2  q. Comparing these factors, one can show that the
second factor exceeds the rst one, only if 2 > 1 and q > 1, or 2 < 1 and
q < 1. This means that, for q > 1, the e¤ects of a change in  on the pro-
motion probability at the end of period T   1 are enforced, while, for q < 1,
they are weakened. If e.g. a marginal decrease in  makes a promotion after
period T   1 more likely, i.e. if 2 > 1, this positive e¤ect on the promotion
probability is enforced for q > 1 so that the switch in attention from period
T   2 to period T   1 is even more distinctive.
4.3 Optimality of promotions as incentive device
In the model, the rm was not able to o¤er the employees explicit incentives,
as no contractible performance measure exists. However, even under this
assumption promotions are not the only feasible incentive device. The rm
could for example pay the employees a bonus in every period depending on
the (relative) assessments of the supervisor. In this way, it might perform
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far better than under the promotion tournament. Yet, in practice promo-
tions are often argued to be an extremely important incentive device. There
are two main problems of subjective bonus payments that are absent under
promotions.
First, empirical studies have demonstrated that bonus schemes su¤er from
a compression of ratings.17 Supervisors tend to distort evaluations by not
su¢ ciently di¤erentiating between employees. The two most relevant forms
of compression are "centrality bias" and "leniency bias". The former bias
refers to a situation, where supervisors evaluate all employees similar to a
certain norm. The latter bias says that supervisors overstate the evaluations
of bad employees. Solutions to these problems as e.g. forced distribution
systems are often unsatisfactory as well. First, the forced distribution may
not match the actual distribution so that the supervisor is forced to choose
incorrect evaluations. Further, the supervisor may achieve a compression of
ratings by evaluating employees as good in one period and as bad in another
one. Under a promotion tournament, the supervisor is unable to achieve a
compression of ratings, so these problems do not arise.
Second, there are fairness considerations. Behavioral economists argue
that employees compare themselves with their peers. Employees that come
o¤ badly may feel envy and employees that come o¤ well may feel compas-
sion.18 These feelings might a¤ect the work environment in an unfavorable
way. Envy e.g. might lead to mobbing and this may decrease performance.
17See, for an overview, e.g. Prendergast (1999).
18See, for example, Fehr & Schmidt (1999) or Grund & Sliwka (2005).
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Under a bonus scheme, these problems should be more severe, as, after pay-
ment of bonuses, employees still work in the same department and so belong
to the same peer. Hence, feelings should be stronger under the bonus scheme,
for there is inequality between employees belonging to the same peer. Fur-
ther, mobbing as a consequence of these feelings is little likely to occur under
promotions, where the employees are separated after payments have been
made.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I tried to model promotions more accurately and added two
ingredients to the existing literature on rank-order tournaments that I think
to be of particular importance. First, employees can rarely be sure that a
workplace becomes vacant and so a promotion actually takes place. As a
result, the employees should assign probabilities to a workplace becoming
vacant at certain points in time. Second, promotions are usually based on
assessments of supervisors rather than on contractible performance measures.
It is thus important to understand, how supervisors aggregate information
to form a view on the employees.
I explore, in this context, two possibilities. On the one hand, early impres-
sions may be most relevant, when assessing an employee. On the other hand,
the supervisor may only recall recent impressions so that these impressions
are the more important ones. These two kinds of information processing are
of importance, when analyzing the e¤ort change resulting from a change in
26
the probability that a vacancy arises in a certain period.
Finally, the model might be a starting point for an explanation of hier-
archies. Suppose that each member of the rm quits his job with an exoge-
nously given probability . The rm may then want to determine the relative
number of employees on a layer in the hierarchy to the number of employees
on the next lower layer such that the promotion probability  is set optimally,
i.e. to induce optimal incentives on the lower layer. This would complement
existing ideas concerning hierarchies (see e.g. Williamson (1967), Calvo &
Wellisz (1978), (1979) or Qian (1994)) that emphasize the relevance of loss
in control for the optimal organization of hierarchies.
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